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vs.-

WENDELL SCOTT, ANNE SCOTT,
and WILLIAM H. THAYNE, dba
THAYNE & COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Civil No.
8403

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
~J.lhis

is an action brought by the plaintiffs as sellers
under a real estate sales agreement dated June 6, 1953
(admitted as an exhibit herein) wherein the defendants
Scott are buyers and the defendant Thayne is the real
estate agent. Pursuant to said agreement Scott entered
into possession of the property on the 20th day of June,
1953, having made the down payment described in the
1
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agreement. During the next three and a half months
the buyer remained _in possession and made certain
alterations to the property including the installation of
drapery rods, later removed. Prior to the entrv of
possession, plaintiff performed certain decorating to th<-~
special order of the buyer. About the middle of September 1953 the buyer having been unable to supply the
balance of the purchase price as provided in said agreement, this action was originally started by the service
of summons only. On October 1, 1953 the original complaint was filed asking for restoration of the premises,
reimbursement for damage to the property during the
term of possession, and damages for breach of the agreement including an $800.00 real estate commission. The
amounts paid by the buyer on the agreement \vere at all
times held by the defendant Thayne. Subsequent to the
entry of default judgment and issue of execution for
restoration of the premises, plaintiff and defendant
Scott entered into a stipulation dated November 11, 1953
whereby they agreed that plaintiff, seller, was entitled
to $115.00 per month for the period of the occupancy
of the defendant Scott. It was further agreed that
Thayne was authorized to restore to Scott all of the
sums represented by the purchase price which it had
held except the sum of $800.00 claimed by it for real
estate commission and by plaintiff as an element of
damage and the further sum of $500.00 claimed as
damage by the seller, and to pay plaintiff the stipulated
rental. The defendant Thayne \Yas at this time made a
party to the action by service upon him of an amended
complaint, asking that he be required to set forth his

2
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claim. This procedure was pursuant to stipulation bet\veen plaintiff and Scott. By answer to the amended
complaint, Thayne admitted the obligation to pay the
real estate commission and consented that judgment be
entered in accordance with the prayer of the amended
complaint. On March 4, 1954, the defendant, Scott, having failed to answer the amended complaint, upon motion
of Thayne, judgment by default \vas entered awarding
plaintiff judgment against Scott for $1300.00 and awarding to defendant, Thayne, a judgment ''over'' in the
amount of $800.00 against the plaintiff Kelly, representing the real estate commission. On June 5, 1954, satisfaction of judgment was filed, the money having remained
at all times in the possession of Thayne. On August 21,
1954, Scott filed a motion to vacate the default judgment
on the theory that defendant, Scott, \Vas not in fact in
default, since by the amended complaint no new issues
\vere made \Vi th respect to him and no answer vvas required. On February 7, 1955 the motion to vacate the
default judgment \Vas heard and order entered vacating
said judgment. On l\!Iarch 9, 1955 the matter was tried
(before a division of court not previously involved in
any of the foregoing matters) and judgment entered in
favor of defendants, Scott, against plaintiff for $1300.00.
Simultaneously judgment \Vas entered in favor of plaintiff against rrhayne for $800.00 representing the real
estate commission. On March 23, 1955 upon motion of
Thayne an order \Yas entered amending the previous
order of February 7, 1955 to recite that the original
default judgment was vacated only as to the defendant
Scott on the theory that Thayne was never properly in
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the law suit, since there was no issue as to him in the
amended complaint. Later, upon motion of Thayne, the
judgment of ~larch 9, 1955 was amended to vacate the
judgment of $800.00 in favor of Kelly against Thayne
on the theory that the original default judgment of
March 4, 1954 constituted an adjudication of the issue
of the real estate commission. Plaintiff appeals from the
judgment against him of the full amount of $1300.00, the
order vacating the judgment in his favor against Thayne
of $800.00, and the order denying his motion to vacate
the original default judgment of March 4, 1954.

POINTS RELIED UPON
1. Blaintiff was entitled to an order vacating the
default judgment of March 4, 1954 in its entirety, that
portion constituting a judgment ''over'' in favor of
Thayne, being a judgment based upon a prior judgment
which had been ''satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based having been
reversed or otherwise vacated, and it being no longer
equitable that a judgment should have prospective application'' within the meaning of rule 60b (6) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The original sales agreement was a valid subsisting agreement not conditioned upon the obtaining of
a loan for its discharge.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to damages for restoring the
condition of the premises irrespective of the agreement.
4
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1. At the outset, there can be no argument but that the record clearly shows from the stipulation of the original plaintiff and defendant and the
amended complaint that the whole purpose of bringing
the defendant Thayne into the law suit was for the protection of the plaintiff respecting the issue of the $800.00
real estate commission. The default judgment entered
March 4, 1954 at the solicitation and instigation of
Thayne must stand or fall in its entirety. That portion
which purports to award a judgment "over" is based
upon the other portions of the award within the meaning
of rule 60b ( 6). The only reason Scott was thereafter
able to obtain the vacation of this judgment subsequent
to the running of the time permitted therefor was because the judgment was void, within Rule 60b (5). It is
submitted the judgment was void in its entirety. Our
rule, except for ·the addition of subsection ( 4) is the
same as Federal Rule 60B and reference must necessarily
be made to the Federal Rules for the construction thereof. The court, in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate
the original default judgment, was impressed with the
fact that a year had transpired since the entry of the
original default judgment and the motion to vacate the
same. Appellant emphasizes that the period between
the very novel and intricate procedure by which Thayne
obtained his order correcting the order setting aside the
default judgment to refer to just the portion thereof
against Scott and the filing of the motion to vacate the
default judgment in its entirety was little more than

5
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sixty days, to-wit: 67 days. It is further submitted that
the time interval to be used as a test for determining
whether plaintiff moved for the vacation .of the judgment within a reasonable time is this shorter period.
That a reasonable time is the only test for the making
of this motion reference is made to Moore, Federal Practice, Volume 7, Section 60.26, Page 275:
"Because of the basis for relief under clause
( 5) the rule quite naturally provides that the
only time limitation under clause (5) is that it
be made within a ' 'reasonable' ' time. . . . The
reasonable time should be applied to the end that
substantial justice is done. This means that the
movant should be given ample time under all the
circumstances within which to make his motion.''
Clause (5) of the federal rule is our clause (6).
Construing this rule the case of Tozer vs. Cha.rles A.
Krause Milling Company, 189 F. (2d) 242 to the effect
that rule 60 (B) should be given a liberal construction,
says that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
petition to set aside the judgment so that the case can
be heard on its merits. In the instant case the action
was heard on its merits and a result contrary to the
default was a\varded. Clearly the whole basis of the
judgment was subverted and rendered null and void.
The entire foundation of that part of the judgment in
favor of the plaintiff is, to the judicial knowledge of the
court, without any validity force or effect and ought
never to have existed. This is exactly the situation to
which rule 60B is aimed. That this rule should be follo\ved to do substantial justice and without regard to
6
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strict construction of pleading (as to construe the
amended complaint as authorizing a consent judgment)
reference is made to the land-mark case of Klapprott vs.
United States, 335 U. S. 601 at Page 614 where the Court
denies the contention that rule 60B is abrogated by strict
analysis of pleading and says :
''To accept this contention would introduce
needless confusion in the administration of rule
60-B and would also circumscribe it with needless
boundaries. Furthermore, 60-B strongly indicates
on its face that courts no longer are to be hemmed
in by uncertain boundaries of these and other
common law remedial tools. In simple English,
the language of the "other reasons" clause for
all reasons except the five particularly specified
vests power in courts adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.''
This case suggests that relief from the original
default judgment as to the portion not previously vaeated
should be given pursuant to either of the final two subsections of rule 60-B.
POINT NO. 2: The trial court was of the opinion
that the description of the purchase price as being ''cash
to a maximum loan'' rendered the contract unenforceable
as being subject to a condition precedent to liability
thereon. It is submitted that this phrase should not be
so construed since the buyer was in effect agreeing to
pay a given purchase price for the property by making
a down payment thereon and agreeing to pay the balance
in cash over and above such amount as he, the buyer,

7
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might be able to raise by real estate mortgage loan. No
particular amount was specified. Conceivably a loan of
a very nominal amount would have been a "maximum"
loan. It is submitted the clause in the contract was not
an aleatory promise over which the parties had no control or over which the seller had any control but was
rather wholly within the province of the buyer to negotiate. As pointed out in Williston on Contracts, Revised
Addition, section 887 A, a promise might be construed as
a condition barring liability where the necessary event
is peculiarly within the control and power of the promisee
or where the cooperation of the promisee is required. It
is submitted that in this case the evidence will show that
although that cooperation was given, it was in fact the
failure of the promissor only that was here involved. It
is submitted that the fact that no words of condition, as
usually considered, are present in this contract since the
evidence shows (cross examination of Mrs. Scott) that
buyer at all times material had the necessary resources
to discharge the purchase price. It would not be fair to
say that the parties intended the words to constitute a
condition even though the contract might normally be
considered to be conditional upon its face. The parties'
intention 'vould negative this conclusion. That this construction is justified see Malden Knitting Mills vs. U. S.
Rubber Company, 16 N.E. (2d) 707. This court has held
in the case of VarnTassel vs. Lewis, 118 U. 356, 222 P.
(2d) 350, that even use of the words "in consideration
of" do not constitute a condition under appropriate circumstances. In the case of Tucker vs. Dougherty Roofing
8
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Cornpany,. 137 S.W. (2d) 884 a contract for re-roofing
cabins provided: ''cash on completion subj~ct _to approval of loan being negotiated at present time.'' This
contract "\vas held not to be a conditional contract but
merely a statement of terms as to mode of payment. It
is submitted that this parallels our case. That courts
favor such construction as opposed to conditions is
apparent from the Restatement of Contracts, Section 261.
This court in the case of Mcintyre vs. Ajax Mining Company, 60 P. 552, 20 U. 323, held that a contract for payment of money ''out of proceeds of ore sales, compromise or otherwise'' was not conditional upon there being
proceeds of ore sales or compromise. It is submitted
that the contract with respect to mortgage loan is intended to define the time of payment only. A reasonable
time must necessarily be implied. Bank of America vs.
Engleman, 225 P. (2d) 597.
POINT NO. 3. It is submitted without argument
that it was error not to award $300.00 damages for
restoration of the premises after possession was surrendered to plaintiff, since even if the contract was not
enforceable as being subject to a condition or otherwise,
the subsequent relationship between the buyer and seller,
as even landlord and tenant, would demand that such
award be allowed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted judgment entered herein
March 9, 1955 in favor of Scott for $1300.00 and for
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Plaintiff for $800.00 be reinstated, or, in the alternatiYe,
that the original judgment of March 4, 1954 be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON,
Attorney for Appellants.
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